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ABSTRACT The rapid development of blockchain technology and their numerous emerging applications
have received huge attention in recent years. The distributed consensus mechanism is the backbone of a
blockchain network. It plays a key role in ensuring the network’s security, integrity, and performance. Most
current blockchain networks have been deploying the Proof-of-Work consensus mechanisms, in which the
consensus is reached through intensive mining processes. However, this mechanism has several limitations,
e.g., energy inefficiency, delay, and vulnerable to security threats. To overcome these problems, a new
consensus mechanism has been developed recently, namely Proof-of-Stake, which enables to achieve the
consensus via proving the stake ownership. This mechanism is expected to become a cutting-edge technol-
ogy for future blockchain networks. This paper is dedicated to investigate Proof-of-Stake mechanisms, from
fundamental knowledge to advanced Proof-of-Stake-based protocols along with performance analysis, e.g.,
energy consumption, delay, and security, as well as their promising applications, particularly in the field of
Internet-of-Vehicles. The formation of stake pools and their effects on the network stake distribution are
also analyzed and simulated. The results show that the ratio between the block reward and the total network
stake has a significant impact on the decentralization of the network. Technical challenges and potential
solutions are also discussed.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, consensus mechanisms, energy, game theory, proof-of-stake, proof-of-work,
security, and mining process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last few years, blockchain technology has been pro-
claimed by many as the most significant technological break-
through since the invention of the Internet. A blockchain is a
distributed database of records shared among network partic-
ipants. With the help of cryptographic hash functions, digital
signatures, and distributed consensus mechanisms, once a
record enters the database, it cannot be altered without the
consensus of the other network participants [1]. As a result,
data stored in a blockchain can be conventionally verified
even in a decentralized environment, which leads to nu-
merous blockchain applications. Cryptocurrencies, the most
famous blockchain applications, have the total market capi-
talization of more than $200 billion by the time this article is
written, with more than 2000 cryptocurrencies networks [2].
Beyond cryptocurrencies, blockchain applications have also
been emerging in various areas, such as finance, healthcare,
military, and Internet-of-Things (IoT) networks [4].
In this paper, we first provide an overview of blockchain
technology including basic concepts, operations, benefits,
and applications. We then briefly present the consensus
mechanisms and discuss the Proof-of-Work (PoW) mech-
anism together with its existing issues. After that, we in-
troduce the key emerging Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus
mechanisms, such as Ouroboros, Chains-of-Activity, Casper,
Algorand, and Tendermint. For each mechanism, we present
the operation, analyze security and energy efficiency, and
evaluate performance through comparisons with other pro-
tocols. We also present several notable blockchain-based
Internet-of-Vehicles networks, where the PoS mechanisms
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are being used as the backbone of their operations. Then, we
discuss and analyze stake pools in a PoS-based network as
well as impacts of factors to the decentralized strategies of
stakeholders through using a non-cooperative game model. In
particular, we first formulate the stake competition problem
among the stakeholders in the PoS-based blockchain network
as a non-cooperative game. In this game, each player (i.e., a
stakeholder, e.g., RSU, in the IoV networks) acts indepen-
dently to maximize the profit which is affected by the actions
of all players. We then prove that this game has a unique Nash
equilibrium and the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is
guaranteed. We also prove that the Nash equilibrium of this
game is Pareto optimal. They are very important features
of this game which are crucial to help the PoS-blockchain
network provider as well as stake pools to design suitable
parameters (e.g., total network stakes, rewards, and so on).
These features are also very important to encourage stake-
holders to participate in and contribute to the PoS-based
blockchain network. Finally, we present some challenges for
the development of future PoS-based blockchain networks
and propose several potential solutions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We first
provide a brief overview of blockchain technology and con-
sensus mechanisms in Section II. We then focus on emerg-
ing PoS-based protocols in Section III and introduce some
applications of PoS in Internet-of-Vehicles networks in Sec-
tion IV. After that, Section V introduces the case study to
examine the interrelations and impacts of network parameters
to the PoS-based blockchain networks. Finally, challenges
and potential solutions are discussed in Section VI, and
conclusions are given in Section VII.
II. OVERVIEW OF BLOCKCHAIN NETWORKS AND
CONSENSUS MECHANISMS
A. FUNDAMENTAL BACKGROUND AND APPLICATIONS
OF BLOCKCHAIN NETWORKS
1) Blockchain Networks
As illustrated in Fig. 1, in the blockchain, transactions (data)
are stored in blocks which form an ever-growing sequence
(chain) shared among participants in the network. Transac-
tions are the fundamental units of a blockchain. For example,
when Alice wants to send money to Bob, she creates a
transaction which consists of her address as the input, her
digital signature to verify that this transaction is made by
her, the amount of money to be sent, and Bob’s address as
the output. Alice then broadcasts this transaction to the net-
work. A miner, i.e., a consensus participant, after receiving
the transaction will validate and include Alice’s transaction,
along with other transactions received from other users, into
a block. If the block is mined successfully, the miner will
broadcast the block to the network for other nodes to verify
the mined block. If this block is verified successfully and
identified to be the first block mined after the last block in
the chain, it will be integrated into the chain and marked as
the latest block in the chain. Besides the transactions, a block
also contains a hash pointer created by hash functions to map
all the block contents to the hash pointer. The main feature
of the hash functions is to ensure that the chain is tamper-
evident. It means that any change in the previous data will
result in a different hash value in the next block, and it can
be traced back to the genesis block, i.e., the first block of the
chain. A block can also contain additional data depending on
requirements of different consensus mechanisms. To reduce
storage space, the transactions in a block can be stored in the
form of a Merkle tree [1].
2) Benefits and Applications
Although blockchain technology attracts a lot of attention
due to the successful implementation of cryptocurrencies, its
benefits extend far beyond. The key benefits of blockchain
technology are as follow:
• Decentralization: Blockchain networks are not con-
trolled by a central controller. Thus, they do not have
any single point of failure. Instead, all the nodes reach
the agreement on the state of the network by participat-
ing in the distributed consensus mechanisms.
• Transparency: Data stored in a blockchain is visible to
all network participants.
• Immutability: Once the data are stored in the
blockchain, it is extremely difficult to be altered. More-
over, thanks to the distributed consensus mechanisms,
the network can achieve consensus on the data even in a
trustless environment.
• Security and Privacy: Using cryptographically secure
mechanisms, the privacy and security of the network
participants can be significantly enhanced. Users in
the network use a pair of public and private keys for
identification and verification. When a user makes a
transaction, a digital signature is used, which can be
easily verified but impossible to forge.
Given the aforementioned outstanding benefits, blockchain
technology has many applications in a number of areas. Some
major applications of blockchain technology are as follow:
• Cryptocurrencies: Cryptocurrencies, e.g., Bitcoin [39],
Ethereum [40], Cardano [22], are the most famous ap-
plications of blockchain technologies. With high value
and daily trade volume, cryptocurrencies can be utilized
for various financial applications, such as digital assets
and online retail.
• Internet-of-Things (IoT) network: Its anonymity and
security make blockchain applicable to many IoT net-
works, e.g., Internet-of-Vehicles [32]–[35], energy trad-
ing [41], [42], electric vehicle charging [43], and smart
home [44], for operations management, trading automa-
tion, and security enhancements.
• Healthcare: Blockchain technologies have been
adopted by many healthcare systems to enhance the
privacy of patient data [45], improve interoperability
across devices [46], and maintain an immutable decen-
tralized database of medical records [47].
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FIGURE 1: An illustration of a blockchain network.
• Military: Blockchains have the potential to be applied
in various military operations, such as enhancing data
integrity in supply chain management, ensuring trans-
parency in equipment management [48], and providing
a distributed and decentralized database for military
intelligence [49].
• Service providers: Blockchain networks have also been
employed by many service providers. Blockchain tech-
nology can support automatic payments, contents distri-
bution, and services delivery [50], [51].
B. CONSENSUS MECHANISMS
Nodes in a blockchain network can be faulty, performing ar-
bitrary or malicious behaviors, or possessing misinformation
due to connection latency, i.e., Byzantine failures. The con-
sensus mechanism is thus the core component of a blockchain
network, which ensures that every participant agrees on the
state of the network in such trustless environments. The
consensus mechanism also governs other operations of the
network, such as transaction adding and incentivizing the
participants to behave properly.
1) Proof-of-Work
Early blockchain networks were developed based on Proof-
of-Work (PoW) mechanism. Generally, the nodes in a PoW-
based blockchain network reach consensus by participating
in a solution searching process, where each node must find
a nonce for its proposed new block. When the nonce, the
previous block’s hash, and the transactions in the new block
are used as the input of the hash function, e.g., SHA-256,
the hash function output must be in a target range so that
the block can be accepted. Due to the property of the hash
function, the nonce can only be found by repeatedly trying
different nonce values until the output is within the target
range. When a participant finds the nonce, it will broadcast
the block along with the transactions to other nodes. Then, if
the new block is verified and determined to be the first block
mined after the last block in the chain, it will be integrated
into the current chain and become the latest block in the
chain.
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In PoW, the participants compete with each other to be
the first to find the correct nonce. This solution searching
procedure can be considered to be a weighted random coin-
tossing process where a participant with a higher hash rate
(computational power) might have higher chances to be
the block winner (leader) who can receive the reward. The
probability pi that participant i is selected to be the leader in








where ci is the hash rate of participant i. This computa-
tion leads to the large amount of energy consumption for
blockchains using PoW consensus mechanisms, as the par-
ticipants try to increase their hash rates to have a higher
chance to be the leader and receive rewards. Moreover, since
participants with low hash rates have very low chances to
win a block and receive rewards, they often join mining
pools to have more opportunities to get revenues. A mining
pool consists of participants who want to collaborate by con-
tributing their computing resources to the pool. In this way,
mining tasks will be distributed to the miners, and due to huge
computing resources, mining pools often get much higher op-
portunities to win a new block than individuals. While joining
a mining pool provides more stable incomes, the nodes in
the pool often do not contribute to the transaction validation
and propagation since they only perform the nonce search
process in a specific range. Thus, mining pools have been
dominating processes making new blocks in most of current
blockchain networks. For example, the top five mining pools
control up to 62.7% total hash rate of the Bitcoin network [3].
This is the most serious issue of PoW-based blockchain
networks because it is against the decentralized spirit of
blockchain technology. Another issue of PoW protocols is
delay. In a PoW-based blockchain network, when a block is
added to the chain, there is still a possibility that this block
will not be included in the main chain for several reasons,
e.g., network delay causing several versions of the chain
or two participants finding two blocks simultaneously. This
possibility decreases exponentially as the block is deeper in
the chain. Therefore, a block is considered to be finalized
only when it is a certain k, usually six blocks deep in the
chain. This delays the transaction confirmation significantly.
Moreover, PoW mechanism is also vulnerable to 51% attack.
In particular, if a single party controls more than 51% of the
network’s total computational power, they can spend their
coins multiple times (in cryptocurrency networks) or prevent
other transactions by adding conflicting blocks to the chain.
While 51% attacks might not be a serious problem for large
blockchain networks, the newly established networks with
small and limited total computational power are especially
vulnerable [4].
2) Proof-of-Concepts
Based on the PoW framework, the Proof-of-Concepts (PoX)
consensus mechanisms have been developed with two major
aims: to replace the PoW solution searching with useful
calculations and to improve the performance of PoW in
terms of security, incentives, and resource usage. To make
better use of the computational resource, several consensus
mechanisms require the participants to solve practical math-
ematical problems such as searching for three types of prime
number chains in Primecoin [6], solving matrix product
problems in Proof-of -Exercise [7], and calculating useful
functions in Proof-of-Useful-Work [8]. Other PoX consensus
mechanisms are designed for distributed data storage service
such as Permacoin [9], KopperCoin [10], and Filecoin [11].
Generally, these consensus mechanisms divide the data files
into segments and distribute them to multiple participants
in the network. To participate in the mining process, the
nodes have to provide proofs of storage, and the more storage
volume a node offers, the better chances it is selected to be a
leader.
Other PoX consensus mechanisms have been developed
with the aim to improve the performance of PoW. The
problem of mining pool formation is addressed by design-
ing nonoutsourceable puzzles to replace the PoW solution
searching process, such as in [12] and [13]. In these networks,
the solution searching processes financially disincentivize
mining pools formation because the node who found the solu-
tion can steal the reward. Other consensus mechanisms have
been developed to reduce the computational requirement of
PoW. The Spacemint [14] network employs a Proof-of-Space
protocol, in which the consensus nodes must provide proof of
storage when participating in the solution searching process.
Different from [9]–[11], the stored files are not useful and
only serve as proofs. Nevertheless, this is still beneficial as
storing a large file consumes negligible energy compared to
nonce searching. In Proof-of-Human-Work protocol [15], the
Completely Automated Public Turing-Test to tell Computers
and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) is employed to involve
human activities and reduce computational requirements in
the solution searching process.
3) Proof-of-Stakes
The first Proof-of-Stakes (PoS) network, Peercoin [16], was
developed as a PoX consensus mechanism with the aim to
reduce the computational requirements of PoW. Participants
with higher coin age, i.e., product of network tokens and their
holding time, have higher chances to be selected. Specifi-
cally, each node in Peercoin solves a PoW puzzle with its
own difficulty, which can be reduced by consuming coin age.
In the more recent PoS networks, the solution searching is
completely removed, and the block leaders are no longer
selected by computational power. Instead, they are selected
based on the stakes that they are holding.
With the stake-based leader selection process, a node’s
chance to be selected to be a leader no longer depends on its
computational power, and thus energy consumption of PoS
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mechanisms is significantly reduced compared with that of
PoW. Moreover, the block generation and transaction con-
firmation speeds are kept at relatively low constant rates by
the PoW networks to ensure security because there are many
different blocks proposed by the miners. In contrast, since
only one block is made in each round of PoS mechanisms,
the block generation and transaction confirmation speeds
are usually much faster, and thus PoS mechanism starts to
become popular recently. In this paper, the PoS mechanisms
are discussed comprehensively in Section III.
4) Hybrid consensus mechanisms
Aiming to reduce the high resources consumption of PoW,
early PoS-based protocols are developed from standard PoW
consensus mechanisms, and thus still incorporate some PoW
elements, which makes hybrid PoW-PoS protocols. The Peer-
coin protocol discussed above can be considered to be a
hybrid consensus mechanism, which utilizes PoS to reduce
the high computational requirement of PoW. Another typical
example is the Proof-of-Activity (PoA) protocol [17], which
employs the PoW to create empty blocks and the PoS to
verify blocks and add transactions. Based on the PoA, the
Snow White protocol [18] was developed in which the main
difference is that PoS is employed first to choose a number
of candidates. These candidates then compete with each other
via the PoW to create blocks.
Other hybrid consensus mechanisms often elect a com-
mittee to verify blocks and confirm transactions. The Hybrid
Consensus protocol periodically elects a committee based on
the hashes of previous blocks to add and confirm transactions.
The Peercensus protocol [19] selects committee members
from the previous block creators. Different from the Hy-
brid Consensus protocol [20], the committee is responsible
for both transaction adding and block confirmation in the
Peercensus protocol.
The hybrid protocols inevitably inherit the strength and
weakness of the consensus mechanisms that they are created
from to some extent. Typically, the energy consumption of
these consensus mechanisms is lower than that of the PoW,
but it is still higher than that of pure PoS protocols. In
addition, the block generation and transaction confirmation
speeds are also higher than those of PoW due to their usage
of PoS and voting committee. The major differences between
the protocols can be found in Table 1.
III. PROOF-OF-STAKE-BASED MECHANISMS
A. PROOF-OF-STAKE: FUNDAMENTAL BACKGROUND
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols were developed as energy-
saving alternatives to PoW. Instead of computational power
resources, leaders are selected based on their stakes, i.e.,
contributions to the blockchain network. Particularly in the
PoS consensus mechanism, the stake of a node is the number
of digital tokens, e.g., coins in cryptocurrencies, that it holds
or deposits. Instead of consuming a lot of energy for the
searching process as in the PoW, a leader will be selected
based on its stakes to perform mining process and add a
new block to the chain as illustrated in Fig. 2. To simulate
the stake-based leader selection process, the Follow-the-
Satoshi (FTS) algorithm has been adopted in many PoS-
based blockchain networks such as Cardano, Sp8de, and
Tezos. In these networks, all the tokens are indexed. The FTS
algorithm is a hash function that takes a seed (i.e., a string
of arbitrary length such as the previous block’s header or a
random string created by some other selected nodes) as the
input. The FTS algorithm then outputs a token index. Using
the index, the algorithm searches the transaction history to
find and select the current owner of that token to be the leader.
Therefore, the probability pi that node i is selected to be the








where si is the stake of participant i. This means that the
more stake a node holds, the higher chance it is selected to be
the leader.
Besides the advantage of low energy consumption, the PoS
mechanisms have faster transaction confirmation speed than
that of the PoW mechanisms. In a blockchain network, the
confirmation of a transaction depends on two main factors,
namely transaction throughput and block confirmation time.
The transaction throughput is the number of transactions per
second Tx/s a network can process, which is vital to the
performance of the network especially when there are many





For example, the Bitcoin network has Blocksize = 1MB,
Txsize = 250bytes, and Blocktime = 600s, so it can
process around 7 transactions per second. The Tx/s de-
termines how quickly a transaction is added to the chain,
whereas the block confirmation time dictates how fast the
transaction is confirmed after it is added. The block confir-
mation time depends on Blocktime, i.e., the average time
it takes for a new block to be added to the chain, and the
finality of the consensus mechanisms. In the Bitcoin network,
a transaction usually has to wait for k = 6 blocks before
it can be confirmed, so the average confirmation time is
k × Blocktime = 3600s = 1hr. Typically in PoS net-
works, the block size is larger, and the block time is much
shorter, thus the transaction throughput is much higher, e.g.,
up to 875Tx/s in [29]. Moreover, some PoS networks can
achieve immediate finality, i.e., k = 1, so their transaction
confirmation time is significantly shorter, e.g., down to 1
second in [30]. Similar to PoW, some PoS protocols such as
[16]–[18], [21], [25], [28] adopt the longest chain rule which
ensures that when there are multiple versions of the chain
(forks), the honest participants will only adopt the longest
fork. As a result, the finality in these protocols is delayed. In
contrast, protocols such as [29], [30] can achieve immediate
finality by voting to confirm block after each round.
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TABLE 1: Consensus Mechanisms Comparisons
PoW PoS Hybrid
Leader selection Based on hash rate Based on stake Depends on variant
Energy consumption Significant Negligible Medium to negligible
Hardware requirement High None Medium to none
Block generation speed Slow Fast Medium to high
Transaction confirmation speed Slow Fast Medium to high
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FIGURE 2: PoW and PoS consensus mechanisms comparison.
The security of PoS protocols depends on various factors.
Among them, network synchrony is crucial to the security
of many PoS protocols because the leader selection pro-
cesses are simulated by voting rounds, where the voters send
their votes to other participants. Since the network cannot
guarantee that all the messages are properly sent in practice
due to network delay and connection complexity, network
synchrony has to be taken into account when considering
the protocol’s security. Some PoS protocols are proven to
be secure as long as the network is partially synchronous,
where messages sent will reach their destinations within a
certain time limit, or asynchronous, i.e., messages may not
reach their destinations.
Apart from the network synchrony, the incentive mecha-
nism is also vital to the security of a PoS consensus mecha-
nism. On the one hand, the reward scheme has to incentivize
consensus participation by rewarding block creators and val-
idators. On the other hand, it also has to penalize malicious
behaviors and prevent various attacks that specifically target
PoS, such as the attacks that involve creating a large number
of blocks because it is much easier to create blocks in
PoS. The PoS protocols often have both reward and penalty
mechanisms, such as [25], [28], [30].
Below, we discuss in more details some emerging PoS-
based protocols which have been widely implemented in
practice, namely Ouroboros, Chains-of-Activity, Casper, Al-
gorand, and Tendermint. Their core components, namely
the consensus processes, are illustrated in Fig. 3, and the
protocols are then compared in Table 2.
B. OUROBOROS
Ouroboros [21] is a pure stake-based protocol, which em-
ploys a dynamic committee selected based on the stake
distribution. The protocol divides time into epochs. In each
epoch, the committee members participate in a 3-phased
coin-tossing protocol to create the seeds for the FTS algo-
rithm. The FTS algorithm then outputs some coin indices,
and the current owners of the chosen coins are selected to
be the leaders and become the committee members in the
next epoch. Different from PoW protocols, in Ouroboros
the leaders only create empty blocks. The input endorsers
are responsible for confirming and adding the transactions
to the blocks. The block rewards are shared between the
committee members, the leaders, and the input endorsers to
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encourage participation in the consensus process. A stake
delegation mechanism, i.e., stakeholders can delegate their
right to participate in the committee, is also incorporated to
incentivize small stakeholders to contribute to the consensus
processes.
Under a partial synchrony network assumption, Ouroboros
is proven to be safe when the adversary controls strictly
less than 51% of the total stake. Since partial synchrony
cannot be guaranteed in practice, Ouroboros considers the
asynchronous nodes to be a part of the adversary nodes. The
dynamic stake distribution is also taken into account and
incorporated into the adversary’s stake. It was also shown
in [21] that the seed creation process cannot be biased
by the adversary, and thus grinding attack, i.e., the block
proposers may try different block’s hash in the attempt to
influence the next leader selection round, is mitigated. The
attacks where the adversary secretly builds alternative forks
to later overtake the main chain, e.g., nothing-at-stake attack
and long-range attack, are mitigated by having only one
designated leader in each round. The incentive mechanism
is also analyzed in the paper, and being honest is proven to
be a δ-equilibrium strategy for the participants. However, the
protocol still cannot withstand 51% attacks, and bribe attacks
are not formally discussed.
Ouroboros has the advantages of low transaction con-
firmation time, e.g., 2 minutes [22], and high transaction
throughput, e.g., around 257 Tx/s [23]. Moreover, because
only the chosen leaders can create blocks in Ouroboros,
energy consumption is negligible compared with those of
PoW-based networks. Another advantage of Ouroboros over
many protocols, including some PoS protocols, is that it
has formal definitions and strong theoretical background to
support its security and incentive compatibility. As a re-
sult, Ouroboros has been adopted by several cryptocurren-
cies, such as Cardano (https://www.cardano.org) and Sp8de
(https://sp8de.com).
C. CHAINS-OF-ACTIVITY
Similar to Ouroboros, in the Chains-of-Activity (CoA) pro-
tocol [25], the leader is selected by the FTS algorithm.
However, the seed for the FTS algorithm is different from
Ouroboros. In CoA, the chain is divided into groups of blocks
of length l, and time is divided into epochs such that in each
epoch, exactly l blocks are added to the chain. The hash of
each block is used to determine a seed of that block. The
seeds of all the blocks created in an epoch are combined
to seed the FTS algorithm for determining the next epoch’s
leaders. At each round in an epoch, a leader is selected by
the FTS algorithm to collect transactions and create a new
block. The selected leader has to make a deposit before
creating a block. The block reward can be claimed by the
leader if the block is created properly, and the deposit will be
confiscated in cases of malicious behavior. The CoA protocol
also introduces the checkpoint blocks, i.e., the blocks that
extend the chain by exactly T blocks, to solidify the chain
and prevent long adversarial forks from taking over.
The CoA protocol is proven to be secured against a number
of attacks. By seeding the FTS algorithm with hashes from
the previous group of blocks, the protocol can effectively
mitigate grinding attacks. Similar to the Ouroboros protocol,
there is only one designated leader to create a block in each
round. Thus, nothing-at-stake and long-range attacks are mit-
igated. Long-range attack is an attack that specifically targets
the protocols where the leaders are determined before their
designated epoch. In these protocols, after realizing that they
are going to be leaders in the next epoch, the stakeholders
might sell their stakes, so that they can behave maliciously
without consequences. With the checkpoint blocks mecha-
nism, every block from the first block to the second most re-
cent checkpoint block can never change, and thus long-range
attack is mitigated by the CoA protocol. The deposit scheme
helps to prevent double-spending attacks, where the attackers
create conflicting blocks to revert confirmed transactions, and
bribe attacks, where the attackers bribe the leaders to conduct
double-spending attacks.
In the CoA protocol, there is only one block created at
each round, and thus energy consumption is small com-
pared with that of the PoW mechanisms. CoA also has
low transaction confirmation time, around 6 minutes [26],
and high transaction throughput, 40Tx/s [27]. However, the
incentive compatibility is not formally analyzed, and the
network synchrony and adversary toleration threshold, which
is crucial to the network security, are completely ignored in
the paper. The cryptocurrency Tezos (https://tezos.com) is
designed partially based on the CoA protocol.
D. CASPER
The Casper protocol [28] was developed by the Ethereum
network in an attempt to ease the transition from the current
PoW protocol to a pure PoS protocol, i.e., it can work on top
of existing PoW protocols. In this context, Casper does not
interfere with the leader selection process. Instead, it employs
a dynamic committee, which votes via a Byzantine-Fault-
Tolerance (BFT) protocol to justify the checkpoint blocks
at every fixed interval, e.g., every 100 blocks. Every block
up to the second latest justified checkpoint is considered to
be finalized. To join the committee, a validator has to make
a deposit to gain voting right proportional to that deposit,
which will be slashed for malicious behaviors.
Casper is proven to be secure as long as 2/3 of the voting
power is controlled by honest validators in a partially syn-
chronous network. By incorporating a withdrawal delay, i.e.,
the validator has to wait for a long period of time before the
deposit can be withdrawn, the protocol can handle dynamic
stake distribution and long-range attack. The other security
issues are implied to be handled by the underlying chain.
Another advantage of Casper is that it can work on top of
other PoW protocols, thereby providing additional security to
the underlying chain. However, Casper’s performance relies
on the underlying PoW mechanism. In addition, another issue
is that the incentive mechanism is undefined in the paper,
despite its key roles in ensuring the participants follow the
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protocol properly. Ethereum (https://www.ethereum.org) has
been developing Casper, and it is expected to be implemented
for future PoW-based blockchain protocols.
E. ALGORAND
Similar to Ouroboros, the Algorand [29] protocol also op-
erates under a committee. However, the protocol uses a
cryptographic sortition mechanism instead of the FTS algo-
rithm to select the leaders and committee members based
on the stake distribution. The cryptographic sortition [29]
is a Verifiable Random Function (VRF) that takes a private
key of a consensus node and a seed as inputs and outputs a
hash and a proof for public verification. Each consensus node
is assigned a range of hash values proportional to its stake
amount. If the hash is within a node’s assigned range, the
node is selected, and thus the node’s chance to be selected is
directly proportional to its stake amount. The main difference
between the cryptographic sortition mechanism and the FTS
algorithm is that with cryptographic sortition, the selected
node is not revealed until it submits the proof, and thus the
node will not be targeted in advance by the adversaries. The
initial seed for the VRF is generated at the beginning using
distributed random number generator and subsequently used
to create a new seed via VRF for the next round. The protocol
also does not rely solely on the leader selection process
for security. The committee is responsible for voting blocks
which will be added to the chain in each round, meaning that
the block is immediately finalized.
Algorand can operate for an asynchronous period, as long
as they are followed by a synchronous period. Under this
assumption, Algorand is proven to be safe as long as 51% of
the total stake is controlled by honest participants. Because
the committee votes to finalize every block, i.e., there is
no fork, many attacks associated with forks, e.g., double-
spending, long-range, nothing-at-stakes, and bribe attacks,
are mitigated. By using a node’s private key and the seed
as inputs, and distributing the private key in advance of the
seed, grinding attack is mitigated as the adversary needs to
influence the leader selection process at the same time.
Although there is more than one block created at each
round in Algorand, the number of blocks created is still
small, and the participants do not compete in hash rate to
create blocks. Thus, the energy consumption of the Algorand
protocol is low compared to that of the PoW mechanisms.
Moreover, Algorand has a high transaction throughput, up to
875 Tx/s [29]. The protocol also has a significant advantage
over many other PoS and PoW protocols since it provides
immediate finality, i.e., the blocks and transactions are imme-
diately finalized, and thus the transaction confirmation time
is much faster, e.g., around 20 seconds [29], than those of the
protocols adopting the longest chain rule such as Ouroboros
and PoW protocols. However, similar to Casper, a significant
issue is that the incentive mechanism is undefined in the
paper. Algorand is currently adopted by several cryptocur-
rencies, including Algorand (https://www.algorand.com) and
Arcblock (https://www.arcblock.io).
F. TENDERMINT
The Tendermint protocol [30] employs the BFT voting pro-
tocol for block confirming. In Tendermint, the validators gain
the right to vote by making a deposit. A proposer is selected
from the validators based on their voting right to propose
a block and include transactions in each round via a deter-
ministic round-robin selection scheme. Similar to Algorand,
the validators vote to confirm the proposed blocks in Ten-
dermint, and thus blocks and transactions are immediately
finalized. The block rewards are distributed among validators
to incentivize consensus participations, and the deposits are
confiscated for malicious behaviors.
Under the assumption of partial synchrony network, Ten-
dermint is proven to be secure as long as 2/3 of the vot-
ing power is controlled by honest participants. Similar to
Algorand, there is no fork in Tendermint, and thus fork re-
lated attacks are mitigated. However, the round-robin leader
selection scheme is not clearly defined. The dynamic stake
distribution is also ignored in the paper.
The energy consumption of the Tendermint protocol is low
compared to PoW mechanisms because there is only one
block created in each round. Similar to Algorand, Tendermint
has high transaction throughputs, e.g., up to 800 Tx/s,
and low transaction confirmation time, e.g., 1 second on
average [31], due to the blocks being immediately finalized.
Although proven to be secure against several types of attacks,
the protocol generally lacks formal definitions and theoret-
ical background, and the incentive mechanism is not ana-
lyzed. Currently, Tendermint has several applications in prac-
tice, such as BigchainDB (https://www.bigchaindb.com), a
blockchain database, and Ethermint (https://ethermint.zone),
a cryptocurrency network.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF POS CONSENSUS MECHANISMS
TO INTERNET-OF-VEHICLES NETWORKS
The rapid development of the Internet-of-Things and net-
working technologies has driven the automotive industry
towards smart vehicles with sensing and communication
abilities, which in turns necessitates a platform for data com-
municating and processing, i.e., Internet-of-Vehicles (IoV)
networks. In these networks, a huge amount of data is com-
municated among the network nodes, e.g., vehicles, road-side
units (RSUs), to improve transport safety and service quali-
ties. However, the development of IoV faces critical security
and privacy issues. IoV networks often rely on centralized
authorities, which can become the single point of failure
due to cyber attacks, capacity limitations, or malfunctioning.
Moreover, since the vehicles continuously leave and join
the network, it is difficult to establish trusts among network
participants, and thus data privacy becomes a significant
issue.
With the benefits of decentralization, security, and privacy,
blockchain technology is a promising solution for the issues
the IoV networks are facing. While the asymmetric keys
and digital signatures enhance the privacy and security of
the users, the distributed consensus mechanism ensures that
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FIGURE 3: Illustrations of several PoS consensus processes.
the IoV network can operate in a decentralized and trustless
environment. However, among the consensus mechanisms,
PoW is not suitable for IoV networks, which consists of many
devices with limited computational capacity. Besides the
high computational requirement, the delay is also a critical
issue that hinders the application of PoW mechanisms in
IoV networks where timing has a significant impact, e.g.,
delay might cause accidents or congestion. Thus, blockchain-
based IoV networks such as [32]–[35] usually adopt the PoS
mechanisms which do not require much computational power
and has higher transaction speed.
A. DATA SHARING SYSTEM FOR IOV NETWORKS
In [32], a blockchain-based system for data sharing between
vehicles and RSUs in an IoV network is proposed. To achieve
the consensus, this system developed a variant of PoS, i.e.,
Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS), where the stake is the
reputation rating of the RSUs. To become a block proposer
candidate, an RSU has to make a deposit, which will be
confiscated for malicious behaviors, and its reputation rating
must be higher than a certain threshold determined by the
system. At each round, a block proposer will be selected
from the candidates via the round-robin selection process to
propose a block which consists of data sharing records and
reputation ratings. The other candidates then vote to append
the new block to the chain.
Although the proposed consensus mechanism has many
similarities to Tendermint, e.g., the leader selected by the
round-robin scheme, other candidates vote to confirm blocks,
and deposit confiscated for malicious behaviors, it has several
differences. Firstly, a stake is defined to be the reputation
rating in this system, which is derived from a reputation
calculation scheme using a subjective logic model based
on the vehicle ratings of the RSUs. Secondly, an incentive
mechanism is designed based on contract theory to distribute
the rewards fairly between the block proposer and the other
candidates.
B. CARPOOLING
With the carpooling service, e.g., Uberpool and Grabshare,
the drivers can publish their destinations on a platform to find
potential passengers with similar travel path, which is useful
to reduce traffic congestion, traveling time, and pollution.
In [33], a blockchain platform is designed for carpooling
services, in which the asymmetric keys and digital signatures
are used to enhance the security and privacy of the passengers
and drivers. The PoS consensus mechanism is adopted to
ensure the integrity of the carpooling records stored in the
chain. Different from [32], only the RSUs participate in the
consensus process in this platform. The blocks consist of the
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TABLE 2: Summary of PoS-based Protocols
Protocol Ouroboros [21] Chains-of-Activity [25] Casper [28] Algorand [29] Tendermint [30]
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Ethermint
carpooling records (transactions), and the stake distribution.
Each RSU’s stake is the number of carpooling records that
it processed, and the leader for each round is selected with
probability proportional to its stake amount.
The consensus process in [33] is similar to that of the CoA
protocol. The only difference is that instead of using the FTS
algorithm, the leader in this platform is selected by the leader
selection function, which takes the stake distribution, the
RSU’s public key, and the time stamp as inputs, and outputs
the leader’s ID.
C. VEHICLE TRUST MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
Since vehicles dynamically and constantly join and leave an
IoV network, it is difficult for them to fully trust the messages
they received, which necessitates a trust management system
for evaluating the credibility of the message senders. In [34],
a blockchain-based decentralized trust management system
is proposed, which employs a hybrid PoW-PoS mechanism
for reaching the consensus on the trust rating data stored in
the chain. In this system, a vehicle broadcasts its rating for
each message that it received. All the ratings for a message
are collected by the RSUs to calculate the offset value of
the message. The RSUs then participate in a PoW mining
process, where they can use the sum of absolute offsets as
stakes to lower the mining difficulty. The first RSU finding
the nonce can add the new block to the chain, which consists
of the offsets values of the messages. A vehicle can assert
the credibility of a message sender by querying any RSU,
which will then calculate the trust value of the sender by
accumulating all its messages ratings.
Since the RSUs usually have similar computational power,
the more stakes the RSU has, the higher chance it is selected
to be the leader. The stake amount is limited with an upper
bound value determined by the network to ensure no single
RSU continuously wins the election. However, an issue of
this system is that the PoW mining process unnecessarily
consumes a lot of energy and can be replaced by a pure stake-
based leader selection for better energy efficiency. Similar
to [33], a critical issue is that the incentive mechanism is
completely ignored in [34]. Consequently, the security of
these networks cannot be analyzed properly, especially in the
events of attacks such as nothing-at-stakes attacks and long-
range attacks.
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D. VEHICULAR AD HOC BLOCKCHAIN
In [35], a blockchain-based framework for vehicular ad hoc
network (VANET) was developed. Maintaining a VANET of
many arbitrary nodes is difficult, especially in the context
of IoV, as vehicles frequently join and leave the network.
The proposed framework addresses this problem by allowing
vehicles to form temporary connections to a small number
of nodes, while the global state of the blockchain is main-
tained by the RSUs. Fundamentally, the network is split
into smaller local networks, each under one RSU. In each
network, the RSU and vehicles reach consensus via the Tezos
protocol [36]. The RSUs then periodically send and receive
information of the global blockchain from the main server.
The Tezos protocol employed in this framework was de-
signed based on the CoA consensus mechanism. Similar to
CoA, the leader is selected based on previous blocks in Tezos.
However, there are also several validators selected by the
FTS algorithm that will sign to confirm each proposed block.
The block reward is shared among the block creator and
validators if they behave properly. They also have to make
deposits which will be confiscated for malicious behaviors.
In this framework, the vehicles mostly interact and make
transactions with each other, while the RSUs participate in
the consensus process as the leader candidates and validators
of the blockchain.
V. STAKE POOLS AND DECENTRALIZATION
A. STAKE POOLS AND STAKEHOLDERS
In the PoS networks, the probability that an individual stake-
holder with a small stake amount is selected to be the leader
is low. Moreover, to participate in the consensus process, a
node must always be connected to the network, which incurs
an operational cost. Therefore, small stakeholders often pool
their stakes together to increase their opportunities to win
blocks and share operational costs, which results in the
formation of stake pools. Similar to the mining pools in PoW
networks, a stake pool is considered to be a single node, and
thus it poses a threat of centralizing the PoS networks. In
particular, the stakeholders, e.g., RSUs, in the IoV networks
often have to perform additional tasks, such as processing
carpooling records [33] and vehicle trust rating inquiries [34].
Thus, the RSUs in these networks might be more inclined to
join the stake pools to reduce their operational costs. In this
section, we examine the stake pools from a game theoretical
perspective to determine the strategic decisions of the stake-
holders, and how these decisions affect the decentralization
of the PoS networks.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider N stakeholders with stakes S = (s1, . . . , sN )
and M stake pools with costs c = (c1, . . . , cM ) and fees
α = (α1, . . . , αM ) in the network. The pool costs are
charged for joining the pool and maintaining its operations.
The pool’s fee is the profit margin of the pool’s owner, which
is usually 3% in real-world stake pools, e.g., Stakecube [53].
When the stakeholder i invests an amount smi in the pool m,
the expected reward rmi is given by
rmi = ρmϕ
m
i (1− αm)R− cme−s
m
i , (4)
where ρm is the proportion of pool m’s stake in the total
network stake, ϕmi is the proportion of player i’s stake in
the total stake of pool m, and R is the block reward. The
pool charges a fee of αm percentage from each stakeholder’s
reward and a cost of cme−s
m
i . It is worth noting that the
cost is inversely proportional to smi , which incentivizes the
stakeholders to invest more stake into the pool. Let N−i
denote the set of all the stakeholders except stakeholder i,
the stake proportion of pool m is
ρm =













i is the total stake of the network,∑
k∈N−i s
m
k is the stakes invested in pool m by all the other
stakeholders except stakeholder i, and σm is the current stake
of pool m. Thus, ρm is the chance that the pool m is selected
to be the leader and can receive the block reward R. When
pool m receives the reward, it calculates each stakeholder’s










for stakeholder i. The cost and fee of the pool are then
deducted from each stakeholder’s share before it is finally
delivered to each stakeholder.
C. GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
To determine the rational stakeholder strategies, the sys-
tem can be analyzed by applying the non-cooperative game
theory. Non-cooperative game [37] is one of the most im-
portant branches of game theory, which models the situa-
tions of conflicting interests among the players. In a non-
cooperative game, each player acts independently to max-
imize the profit which is affected by the actions of all
players. A non-cooperative game in strategic form is denoted
by G(N , (Si)i∈N , (ri)i∈N ), which consists of three compo-
nents: the set of players N = (1, . . . , N), the strategy set
Si consists of possible strategies for each player i, and the
payoff function of each player ri. Let S−i denote the strategy
set of all players except player i, the strategy s′i is strictly
dominated by si if:
ri(s
′
i, s−i) < ri(si, s−i),∀s−i ∈ S−i. (7)
In other words, s′i is strictly dominated by si if si yields
a better payoff given any possible strategies of the other
players. In this case, the dominated strategies can be elimi-
nated because the player has no reason to choose a strategy
that always gives worse payoff. If there exists a si which
dominates all other possible strategies of player i, si is the
dominant strategy. In the case where every player has a
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dominant strategy, the system can reach a dominant-strategy
equilibrium because all the players will rationally choose
their dominant strategies. Nevertheless, dominant strategies
do not often exist in many non-cooperative games.
Another type of desirable outcome of non-cooperative
game is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium [37] where every
player cannot get a better payoff by unilaterally changing to
any other strategies. Let s∗ and s∗−i respectively denote the
strategy of player i and the strategies of all players except
player i at the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, then for every





−i) > ri(si, s
∗
−i),∀si ∈ Si. (8)
In other words, at the Nash equilibrium, no player can acquire
a better payoff by independently switching to any other
strategy. At such state, if all the players act rationally, the
system becomes stable because no player has the incentive to
deviate from the Nash equilibrium [37].
In the considered stake-pool game, the players (stake-
holders) can freely invest their stakes in any amount within
their budgets in any pool. The strategy set Si of player i










payoff of player i from pool m can be expressed as:
rmi = ρmϕ
m






























As shown in (9), the payoff of player i in pool m increases
when smi increases. However, its payoff decreases as the
other players increase their investments in any pool, i.e., τ
increases, implying that the players have conflicting interests.
Thus, non-cooperative game theory is applied to analyze the
stake pools and the behaviors of the stakeholders.
Let G denote the game with N players and M pools.
To analyze G from a game theoretical perspective, we first
examine the existence of the Nash equilibrium of this game.
Theorem 1. The game G admits at least one Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 states that there is at least one Nash equilibrium
in G. Nevertheless, the main concerns when analyzing the
Nash equilibria of a game also involve the uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium as well as whether the player’s strategies
can converge to this point. To analyze the uniqueness and
convergence to the Nash equilibrium, we first prove that for
every player, the strategies which invest less than the avail-
able budget are strictly dominated by the strategies which
invest all the budget.
Theorem 2. Let s′i denote a strategy where player i invests




i < si,∀smi ∈ s′i,





i = si,∀smi ∈ si. For every s′i, si ∈ Si, s′i
is dominated by si.
Proof: See Appendix B.
As a result of Theorem 2, the strategies where the players
do not invest all the budget can be eliminated from the
strategy space. Based on this result and [38], we prove that
the game G has a unique Nash equilibrium and G can always
converge to the equilibrium.
Theorem 3. The game G has a unique Nash equilibrium s∗
and the convergence to s∗ is guaranteed.
Proof: See Appendix C.
To find the Nash equilibrium, an iterative algorithm (Algo-
rithm 1) is developed. Generally, Algorithm 1 computes the
best response strategy for player i when all the other players’
strategies are fixed. The obtained result is then fixed as the
new strategy of player i, and the algorithm continues to find
the best response for player i+ 1 and so on. The algorithm is
stopped when the players no longer make any move, i.e., the
Nash equilibrium is reached.
Algorithm 1 employs a loop to find the best strategy for
every player, starting from player 1. To find the best response,
Algorithm 1 performs an exhaustive search which calculates
the expected payoff for each possible strategy. During the
search, if a better payoff is found, the value is recorded
and the strategy is marked as the best response. The search
continues until the whole strategy space is enumerated. Then,
the newly found best response is fixed as the strategy for the
player, and the algorithm continues to find the best response
for the player 2 and so on. After the strategy of player N
is set, the algorithm starts the loop again from player 1.
The loop is repeated until there is no change in the strategy
of every player during a whole loop. Since Algorithm 1
exhaustively enumerates the possible search space, it can
be regarded as a brute force search algorithm. The main
procedure of Algorithm 1 is the loop, and the complexity of
Algorithm 1 depends on the input size (si), the number of
nested loops (M ), and the number of players N . Formally,
the worst-case time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(NηM ),
where η is the input size [52].
For example, consider a small game of two players with
stake budgets s = (100, 200), two pools with costs c =
(0.5, 0.3) and fees α = (3%, 3%), and a block reward
R = 10. The Pareto-optimal strategies, i.e., the strategies
which give a player the best payoff without decreasing the
payoff of other players [37], are also calculated. In this ex-
ample, the algorithm finds a unique Nash equilibrium where
s11 = 35, s
2
1 = 65, s
1
2 = 36, s
2
2 = 164 as shown in Fig. 4.
The result shows that although a pool with lower cost and
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Algorithm 1 Iterative Algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium
1: repeat
2: max← 0
3: for s11 := 0 to s1 do
4: . . .





6: if r1 > max then . Find the best strategy of
player 1
7: max← r1
8: (x11, . . . , x
M




12: (s11, . . . , s
M
1 )← (x11, . . . , xM1 ) . Fix player 1’s
strategy
13: . . .
14: max← 0
15: for s1N := 0 to sN do
16: . . .





18: if rN > max then . Find the best strategy
of player N
19: max← r2
20: (x1N , . . . , x
M




24: (s1N , . . . , s
M
N )← (x1N , . . . , xMN ) . Fix player N ’s
strategy
25: until No player changes strategy
fee attracts more stakes from the players, if the pools are
competitive, i.e., their costs and fees are not significantly
different, the stakes will not converge into a single pool, and
thus decentralization is ensured.
In the following, we prove that the Nash equilibrium of the
considered stake-pool game is also Pareto optimal.
Theorem 4. The Nash equilibrium of the game G is Pareto-
optimal
Proof: See Appendix D.
D. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
To evaluate more general cases, 20 instances of G are
simulated. Each instance represents a network consists of
1000 stakeholders and five pools with parameters derived
from real-world stake pools [53]–[56] and cryptocurrency
networks [24]. The parameters and results of each instance
are shown in Table 3. The first 10 instances are created to
examine the effects of pool parameters on the network stake
distribution, while the remaining instances are simulated to
study the effects of the block reward and total network
stake. At each iteration of the simulation, Algorithm 1 is
employed to find the best strategy for a player, while the other
players fix their strategies. Similar to the two-player case, the
algorithm stops when the Nash equilibrium is reached.
The simulation results of the first 10 instances are illus-
trated in Fig. 5. These instances represent the cases with
different combinations of pool parameters, while the total
network stakes and block rewards are fixed. Instance 1 is the
case where there is a pool with the lowest cost and fee in
the network. The simulation results show that at the Nash
equilibrium, all the network stakes go to the best pool. In-
stances 2 and 3 show that when a pool reduces its fee or cost,
it can attract a portion of stake from the dominating pool,
resulting in the network stake divided into 2 pools. Similarly,
instances 3 to 7 show that if the other pools decrease their
costs or fees, some stakeholders will switch to those pools.
As the pool owners continue to adjust their stakes and fees,
the network stake will be divided into 5 pools as shown in
instance 8. Instances 9 and 10 show the other combinations of
pool parameters under which the network stakes are divided
into all the pools.
The network stakes and block reward parameters are varied
to study their effects on the stake distribution in the last 10
instances. Among them, instances 11 to 15 are simulated to
examine the impacts of the block rewards. Fig. 6 illustrates
the influences of R on the stake distribution at the Nash
equilibria. At the beginning (instance 11), the stakeholders
invest in all the pools. As R increases while the other pa-
rameters remain unchanged, the pool that charges the highest
fee, namely pool 5, attracts fewer stakes. When R = 10,
pool 5 becomes empty (instance 12). As shown in (4), each
pool charges a fee directly proportional to the reward each
player receives. Since the block reward is doubled in this
case, the fee amount is also doubled, while the costs charged
by the pools remain the same. As a result, the advantage
of pool 5 in terms of the low cost no longer outweighs its
disadvantage of the high fee, and thus all stakeholders leave
pool 5. As R keeps increasing, the simulation shows that the
pools which charge higher fees become less desirable, e.g.,
when R = 25, pools 4 and 5 become empty (instance 13),
and when R = 500 all players invest to pool 1 which has
the lowest fee (instance 15). Similarly, the reward function is
inversely proportional to the total network stake τ . When τ
decreases, the reward increases, and consequently the pools
that charge higher fees become less desirable and eventually
empty (instances 16 to 20) as shown in Fig. 7. In summary,
the results show that while the pool’s cost and fee are not
controlled by the network providers, the block reward and
the total network stake can be adjusted to maintain the
decentralization of the network.
VI. CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS OF
POS PROTOCOLS
In addition to the huge advantages with many promising ap-
plications, the development of PoS consensus mechanisms is
still in a nascent stage. Developing effective PoS mechanisms
for future blockchain networks has been facing challenges for
several reasons.
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FIGURE 5: Simulation results of instances 1 to 10.






















FIGURE 6: The influence of R on stake distribution.
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TABLE 3: Parameters and Results of 20 Simulation Instances.
No. R τ Cost of pool (c) Fee of pool (α) Stake distrbution at pool (%)1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 3 10000 3 8 7 8 5 3 4 5 7 9 100.0 0 0 0 0
2 3 10000 3 8 7 8 5 3 2.5 5 7 9 69.1 30.9 0 0 0
3 3 10000 3 2 7 8 5 3 4 5 7 9 51.4 48.6 0 0 0
4 3 10000 3 2 7 8 5 3 4 5 7 2.5 14.9 48.1 0 0 37.0
5 3 10000 3 2 7 8 1 3 4 5 7 9 52.3 26.3 0 0 21.4
6 3 10000 3 2 7 8 1 3 2.5 5 7 9 30.9 28.3 0 19.8 21.0
7 3 10000 3 2 7 1.2 1 3 4 5 7 9 52.2 13.2 0 12.2 22.4
8 3 10000 3 2 7 1.2 1 3 2.5 5 7 9 21.9 13.3 18.7 12.2 33.9
9 3 10000 4 2 1.5 1.2 1 1 2 3 5 9 35.3 30.8 12.4 12.6 8.9
10 3 10000 5 2.5 2 1.2 1 1.5 2 2.5 4 5 21.4 12.8 35.6 14.6 15.6
11 5 10000 4 2 1.5 1.2 1 1 2 3 5 9 50.2 16.1 13.1 11.4 9.2
12 10 10000 4 2 1.5 1.2 1 1 2 3 5 9 64.5 14.2 11.1 10.2 0
13 25 10000 4 2 1.5 1.2 1 1 2 3 5 9 65.7 24.4 9.9 0 0
14 100 10000 4 2 1.5 1.2 1 1 2 3 5 9 91.1 8.9 0 0 0
15 500 10000 4 2 1.5 1.2 1 1 2 3 5 9 100.0 0 0 0 0
16 10 25000 25 12 7 4 1 1 2 3 5 9 58.3 12.1 11.9 10.2 7.5
17 10 2500 25 12 7 4 1 1 2 3 5 9 81.2 6.8 6.9 5.1 0
18 10 1000 25 12 7 4 1 1 2 3 5 9 92.3 4.5 3.2 0 0
19 10 500 25 12 7 4 1 1 2 3 5 9 95.2 4.8 0 0 0
20 10 250 25 12 7 4 1 1 2 3 5 9 100.0 0 0 0 0






















FIGURE 7: The influence of τ on stake distribution.
A. SECURITY ISSUES
The current designs of the PoS protocols are facing several
security issues. Firstly, since the block generation consumes
negligible resources, rational participants may try to create
different blocks or forks, i.e., nothing-at-stake attacks [4].
Secondly, the adversary may try to bribe the leader, i.e.,
bribe attacks, to perform double-spending attacks [4]. To
mitigate these attacks, the protocols can confiscate a leader’s
deposit in case of malicious behaviors as shown in [30] and
[28]. In the protocol where there is no penalty mechanism,
e.g., [21], the nothing-at-stake attack can be mitigated by
having exactly one leader in each round. However, without
a penalty mechanism, it is difficult to prevent bribe attacks.
Another type of attack that specifically targets on the
PoS protocols using voting mechanisms is long-range at-
tack [28]. For voting-based PoS protocols, the committee
members may sell their stakes immediately at the beginning
of the epoch they are selected. They are then unaffected
by the incentive mechanism yet still have the voting rights.
Consequently, they may behave maliciously without being
affected by the penalization. Some protocols deal with such
attacks by locking the stake of the committee member for
a predefined period of time after the epoch ended [28]. By
using a committee to vote for every block, once a block is
appended to the chain it is finalized. Thus, the transaction
history cannot be changed, and all the mentioned attacks are
mitigated.
Some PoS protocols where the leader is selected based
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on the header of the previous block are also vulnerable
to grinding attacks [4]. To mitigate such kind of attacks,
we can use the seeds which cannot be influenced by the
adversary, e.g., the hashes of previous blocks in [25] or the
seeds created by the committee in [21]. A common issue of
most PoS consensus mechanisms is that they lack theoretical
background and formal definitions to support their security.
There are many attacks targeting PoS networks, but they
have not yet been extensively investigated. A formal security
model for the PoS protocols is also desirable, yet studies on
this topic have been limited.
B. INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
Similar to PoW and PoX protocols, the incentive mecha-
nisms, including consensus participation rewards and ma-
licious behavior penalties, play a key role in ensuring the
proper behaviors of participants in PoS-based protocols.
Generally, the incentive mechanisms are designed to ensure
that following the protocol properly outweighs the economic
gains from malicious behaviors. However, many protocols
lack analyses of the incentive mechanisms. The user’s ra-
tional behaviors must be taken into account in consensus
mechanisms, especially in PoS protocols, where the stake
distribution affects the consensus process, yet the stake trade
has high liquidity. Moreover, most protocols often ignore the
stake trade outside of the network when considering their se-
curity. A potential solution to these problems is analyzing the
user’s rational behaviors using game theoretical approach,
such as in [21], to design the effective incentive mechanisms.
C. PROTOCOL DESIGNS
Generally, each presented protocol includes a set of factors
(e.g., consensus process, transaction adding process, and
incentive mechanism). Each factor has impacts on several
aspects, e.g., security, processing speed, and finality, of the
protocol, and the question of to what extent each factor
influences each aspect lacks a quantitative answer. Thus,
rigorous analyses of each factor design are needed to evaluate
their effects on the performances of the blockchain networks,
as well as their mutual interactions. Based on the analyses, a
systematic approach to protocol factor design can be devel-
oped for future blockchain networks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided an overview of the con-
sensus mechanisms, the core unit of a blockchain network.
We have then presented and compared several notable PoS
consensus mechanisms, which have many advantages over
the widely used PoW mechanisms. We have also discussed
PoS blockchain applications in the field of IoV, and analyzed
the formation of stake pools in PoS networks. We have shown
that maintaining an appropriate ratio between the block re-
wards and the total network stakes is crucial to the decen-
tralization of the network. Finally, we have discussed several
challenges in developing effective consensus mechanisms
for future blockchain network and the potential solutions to
address these problems.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
According to [37], if the payoff functions are concave and
the strategy sets of the two players are compact and convex,
there exists at least one Nash equilibrium in this game. To
prove that the game admits at least one Nash equilibrium,
we first prove that the reward functions of all the players are





A sufficient condition to prove that ri is concave is that the
payoff from every pool rmi is concave. The reward of player







LetM−m denote the set of all pools except pool m,
smi
τ























(1− αm) is concave
((1− αm) > 0, otherwise the pool charges more than 100%
fee, which is impractical). Since −cme−s
m
i is also concave
(e−s
m
i is convex and −cm is negative), rmi is concave. Thus,
the reward function of every player is concave. In addition,
the strategy sets of all players are defined as compact and
convex sets. As a result, this game admits at least one Nash
equilibrium.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2














Now assume that player i is employing strategy s′i which




i < si. In
this case, if the player chooses a strategy si which invests the

























where ∆smi is the extra amount invested in pool m. Then,
the difference between the payoff of the strategy si and the
strategy s′i is expressed in (15). For the strategy si to yield
better payoff than the strategy s′i, the condition ri − r′i > 0
must hold. As can be seen from (15), e−s
m
i − e−(smi +∆smi ) is
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i . Then, a sufficient
condition for ri − r′i to be positive is that (αj − αm) ≥ 0.
Since there is no limit on the amount of stake a player can
invest in a pool, if player i chooses to invest ∆smi in the pool
with the lowest fee, i.e., αm ≤ αj ,∀j ∈M, then (αj −αm)
will always be nonnegative. As a result, ri − r′i is always
positive, regardless of the strategies of the other players. This
means that s′i always gives worse payoff than si, and thus s
′
i
is always dominated by si.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Let θ(s, ω) denote the weighted nonnegative sum of the





where ωi is the weight of players i. The pseudogradient



















According to Rosen’s theorem [38], if θ(s, ω) is diagonally
strictly concave for some fixed ωi > 0,∀i ∈ N , the game
has a unique Nash equilibrium. In [38], it is proven that
a sufficient condition for θ(s, ω) to be diagonally strictly
concave is that the matrix Ψ = [G(s, ω) + GT (s, ω)] is
negative definite, where G(s, ω) is the Jacobian of g(s, ω)






















































As proven in Theorem 2, the strategies where there is any
player who invest less than the budget can be eliminated from
the strategy space. Thus, the total network stakes become a
constant, i.e., τ =
∑N



















As shown in (19),
∂ri
∂smi
is a function depending only on smi .
Thus, if we take the partial derivative again with respect to
any variable other than smi , it becomes zero, which is the
value for any non-diagonal elements of G(s, ω) (17). The








If we choose ω1 = . . . = ωN = 1, Ψ becomes:
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In this game, the matrix Ψ (21) is a symmetric diagonal
matrix with all negative diagonal elements, which satisfies
the condition (−1)kDk > 0, where Dk is the kth leading
principal minors. Thus, the matrix is negative definite and
therefore, θ(s, ω) is diagonally strictly concave. As proven
in [38], if G satisfies the diagonally strict concavity property,
G has a unique Nash equilibrium and starting from any
feasible point in S the game will converge to the Nash
equilibrium.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 4
A strategy set si is Pareto-optimal if no player can get a
better payoff without decreasing the reward of any other
player [37]. Let s∗i and s
∗
−i denote the strategies at the
equilibrium of player i and all other players except player
i, respectively. Let r∗i denote the total payoff of player i at
the equilibrium. Suppose (for the sake of contradiction) that
there exists another set of strategies s′−i of the other players




















which means τ ′ > τ∗. However, by Theorem 2 we have∑M
j=1 s
j
i = si,∀i ∈ N at s∗, which means τ∗ ≥ τ ′. Thus,




i . In other words, at the
equilibrium no player can change its strategy to decrease any
other player’s reward.
Furthermore, by the Nash equilibrium definition (8), s∗i is




−i) > ri(si, s
∗
−i). Thus,
player i cannot increase ri by deviating from s∗i . Since at
s∗ the players also cannot decrease the reward of any other
player, s∗ is Pareto-optimal.
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